BY VICTORY OKONJI
The atmosphere in Warri has been charged up recently following the siege laid on the Escravos oil production facility in Ogidigben by youths of the Itsekiri community, collectively protesting against what they consider to be a grave injustice that threatens to sully their history and legacy. The mood is one of unity and determination, even as the rest of Delta State continue to observe the proceedings with keen interest.
When the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) disclosed the proposed ward delineation, it immediately sparked a seismic wave of anger and discontent among the Itsekiri people, who perceived the changes made during the ward allocation as a calculated attempt to undermine their political representation within the Warri Federal Constituency. At the heart of their grievance lies the allocation of wards across Warri North, Warri South-West, and Warri South Local Government Areas (LGAs).
This modified distribution, which grants increased representation to the Ijaw and Urhobo ethnic groups, implicitly sidelines the Itsekiri people in areas historically marked as their strongholds. For instance, Warri North would now have 18 wards, with 10 allocated to the Ijaws and only 8 to the Itsekiri, despite the latter’s longstanding cultural presence and identity in the region.
The delineation in Warri South-West exacerbates this disparity, with 14 wards assigned to the Ijaws and 5 left to the Itsekiri. This stark contrast has been met with intense backlash from the Itsekiris, who fault the allocation as lacking a true representation of the demographics of the area. Some of them have asserted that the delineation not only diminishes their ability to advocate for the needs of their community, but also sets a dangerous precedent for future governance in the region. Warri South LGA, home to a more diverse population, presents another contentious division. INEC’s proposal allocates 9 wards to the Urhobo, 8 to the Itsekiri, and 3 to the Ijaw, leaving the Itsekiri feeling shortchanged with protesters lamenting the delineation as another chapter of exclusion in the history of the state.
The Battle For Respect
The Itsekiri community, voicing their anger over the perceived slight by INEC, view this peculiar moment as pivotal stemming from their demand for fair representation, recognition and due respect. While sharing his thoughts on the matter, Secretary of the Itsekiri Leaders of Thought, Sunny Amorighoye, blatantly called out INEC over sacrificing their constitutional responsibilities at the altar of dishonesty to play an “Ijaw script.”
According to him, “What INEC is doing today is just dancing to the Ijaw script to build a territory of Ijaws, seizing people’s territory and land from Ondo to cross rivers. The Ijaws have an agenda in Nigeria, and the earlier we all know it, the better for Nigeria. They want to create a territory of their own from Ondo State, Delta, Rivers, Edo, Akwa, Ibom and all that of Nigeria, and they dominate the whole of Bayelsa,”
“In Warri South, there is no Ijaw at all. In 1966, they went to court to claim that the rule of Warri belongs to them, trying to grab lands, but the court held and banned them from ever contesting ownership of Warri. So on the issue of ownership of land in the three local governments, it has been contested, but they will not obey the court judgment. Who owns where has been determined. Even though the ones who go to court when the judgment is against them, they feel that the judgment is fake, so they will not obey it.”
When asked to shed light on the protests going on in Warri, an Itsekiri man named Toju claimed that his people have been the target of tacit and subtle scorn over the years.
“This is not the first time we have been undermined and pushed to the edge, but this time around we will speak our mind because we don’t our children to inherit this disrespect,” he said.
At the core of this entire brouhaha is the belief that the Itsekiris’ political agency is being systematically and gradually diminished. Meanwhile, INEC has done very little to assuage the fears of the Itsekiris with their latest report on the delineation, mandated by a Supreme Court Judgement. Another belief that has fueled the turmoil and angst within the Itsekiri community, is that the interests of the Ijaw and Urhobo groups are being prioritized at their expense.
The current debate among political pundits and casual observers is whether this delineation is truly indicative of a bigger picture. Are there truly any intentions by the government to subdue the Itsekiris capacity to influence governance, especially in a region where their contributions, particularly in the oil sector, have been historically significant? Is there an existential threat to their political position based on antecedents, or are people chasing fishes in the sky with another conspiracy?
Political Representation: A Niger Delta History
Since Nigeria gained full independence in the year 1960, the Niger Delta region has continued to experience significant changes in political representation. From the onset, the region was technically part of the broader Eastern Region, where ethnic minorities faced uphill battles to secure adequate political representation in the midst of larger groups like the Igbos exercising major dominance. It was the struggle for equitable representation that led to the creation of Rivers State in 1967, providing minorities such as the Ijaw an avenue to assert their political agency. This did little to reduce the challenges however, as political power in Rivers State tended to favor certain dominant groups, creating yet another landscape where minorities were brushed to the sidelines.
The creation of more states in the subsequent decades, particularly Delta in 1991 and Bayelsa in 1996 marked another significant evolution in representation. In Delta State, it gave ethnic groups like the Ijaw, Urhobo, and Itsekiri greater opportunities to influence governance in their respective territories. In spite of all this, intra-regional tensions remained prominent. Rivalries between ethnic groups over access to political power and control of resources such as oil have frequently shaped electoral outcomes, appointments, and governance in the Niger Delta.
The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta added an entire new dimension to these internal squabbles, with the region becoming a major hub for oil production in the country. Political leaders from the region started to gain national prominence, advocating for resource control and greater fiscal federalism. Organizations like the Ijaw Youth Council and the Niger Delta Avengers emerged to pressure the government to address the region’s developmental needs. All of their efforts, while spotlighting the issues facing the greater Niger Delta, also underscored the complexity of political representation in a region divided along ethnic lines.
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), established in 2000, was another one of many efforts designed to bridge the developmental gaps within the region and improve political representation through infrastructure and development projects. Accusations of mismanagement and favoritism have hindered its effectiveness however, fueling cries for further decentralization and equitable distribution of resources and representation. Despite the fact that over the years, representation has evolved through pathways in the grassroots, local governance structures, and the appointment of regional figures to federal positions, ethnic identities continue to influence political dynamics, with the Niger Delta serving as yet another portrait and/or microcosm of Nigeria’s broader struggle to balance unity with diversity.
COMPLEX ETHNIC RELATIONS IN WARRI PROVINCE
Sentiments of discrimination and unfair treatment have been expressed bluntly in the past among all the ethnic groups within the Warri Province. Both Ijaw and Urhobo have previously called out the unfairness of the Itsekiris dominance of government structures in all three Warri Local Government Areas (LGA). From a historical standpoint, the Itsekiris were the first tribe within the Warri Province to make contact with European traders in the 15th century. By monopolising the European slave trade at the time, they were able to establish reasonable dominance over neighboring ethnic groups within the region. They also established control over land use during the British Empire through early legal documents. With the advent of colonialism which influenced the eventual restructuring of the political boundaries in the region, the Itsekiris’ traditional authority slowly began to erode.
In the years following the creation of Delta State, the Ijaws and Urhobos have both taken exception to the Itsekiris’ supposed dominance. The title of the Itsekiri traditional leader alone, “Olu of Warri”, technically fashioned by Obafemi Awolowo while he was still the Premier of the Old Western region, became a serious point of contention among the ethnic groups in Warri. Beyond that, the Ijaws and Urhobos have challenged the Itsekiris’ over benefitting disproportionately from government resources – both at the level of government contracts and appointments and, for example, when it comes to obtaining “certificates of origin” in order to obtain government bursaries for higher education. With control over government structures, valuable contracts are easier to secure from major companies. As a corollary, the Ijaws and Urhobos have long clamored for the creation of new wards and local government areas to effectively represent their respective ethnic groups.
Decisions made during the colonial era regarding ethnic boundaries have had long-lasting implications for political representation in the Niger Delta. During British colonial rule, administrative divisions were often created based on economic convenience rather than cultural or ethnic affinities. Boundaries were redrawn to facilitate easier extraction of resources like oil and palm produce, ignoring pre-existing ethnic ties and setting the stage for many decades of inter-ethnic conflicts and competition in the region. This colonial legacy has been evident in land ownership disputes, as colonial authorities favored certain groups over others when allocating resources. In the Niger Delta, the Itsekiri benefited significantly from their early collaboration with colonial powers, securing control over trade and political structures. These advantages subsequently shaped contemporary grievances among groups like the Ijaw and Urhobo.
Constitutional Framework And Federal Character
Section 14 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended, accords due and explicit recognition to multi-cultural fabric of the nation, particularly in sub-sections 3, where it is stated that “the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.”
The term federal character alludes to the distribution of political, economic, and administrative representation among Nigeria’s various ethnic groups in equity and without bias, ensuring that every group regardless of size or influence, has the capacity to influence governance. The ward delineation is a practical example of this constitutional mandate in application. The principle highlighted in Section 14, sub-section 3 carries legal weight and serves as the foundation for policies and frameworks governing representation. By dividing constituencies into smaller wards, the government is able to facilitate grassroots participation in governance, enabling communities to elect representatives who truly understand their needs and aspirations.
As a result, there’s also a huge responsibility on government agencies to uphold these principles in their operations and this is why agencies tasked with redrawing electoral boundaries must consider not only population data but also the cultural and ethnic contexts, cementing the notion that inclusivity is indeed, central to Nigeria’s democratic identity. However, all of the aforementioned details are ultimately inconsequential if their proper implementation is being disregarded.
INEC is the sole body in Nigeria responsible for the delineation of electoral wards and according to the Electoral Act of 2022, the commission is tasked with reviewing and adjusting electoral boundaries periodically to reflect population changes and ensure fair representation. The Act also requires INEC to consult stakeholders and consider demographic data during the delineation process, balancing representation among ethnic groups and maintaining the integrity of electoral processes in the same breath.
Over the years, INEC have not exactly had a stellar reputation in the eyes of the public. Ever since Nigeria became a democratic republic in the late 1990s, the commission has faced continuous criticisms for its’ general lack of transparency, allegations of bias in electoral processes, favoritism towards certain groups and voter suppression. After repeated failures to inspire confidence in heart of the public, it is not far-fetched to see why there’s a significant element of distrust that has shaped the movement of the Itsekiris thus far. The proposed ward delineation is now perceived as yet another politically motivated act to favor some ethnic groups over the others.
Poor communication and stakeholder engagement on INEC’s part has done them no favors, fueling the belief that the genuine concerns of the Itsekiris are being deliberately ignored. This is not the first time the electoral body has been strongly criticized for its slow response and overall lack of accountability, eliciting a sense of futility among affected groups, who feel that their voices will not be heard or their issues resolved.
1995: A Cautionary Tale
Most pundits adequately versed in Nigeria’s political history would argue that taking the grievances of a single ethnic group as a trivial matter is the fastest route to tragedy. A perfect cautionary tale that exemplifies this argument is the Ogoni case of 1995, which ultimately ended in the infamous execution of the popular activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni youths. In the early 1990s, allegations of severe environmental degradation and human rights abuses due to oil extraction activities were levied at Shell Petroleum Development Company and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) by the people of Ogoni. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) filed a complaint on behalf of the Ogoni people with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, alleging violations of their rights to health, a clean environment, housing, and food under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The complaint detailed the widespread contamination of soil, water, and air in Ogoniland, which resulted from oil spills and gas flaring. Furthermore, it highlighted the destruction of homes, crops, and livestock, as well as the intimidation and violence faced by the Ogoni people. Amid the chaos, the Nigerian government was accused of colluding with oil companies to suppress dissent and prioritize oil production over the well-being of local communities.
In 2001, the African Commission issued a groundbreaking decision, finding the Nigerian government in violation of several provisions of the African Charter. The Commission emphasized that the government had failed to protect the Ogoni people’s rights to health, a clean environment, and adequate housing. It also criticized the government’s use of military force to suppress protests and its failure to regulate the activities of oil companies. There’s something to be celebrated about the fact that the case was able to demonstrate the potential of regional human rights mechanisms to address major problems that national systems fail to resolve, however it also highlights the broader implications of neglecting minority rights in resource-rich regions.
Economic Fallout: Oil Production At Stake
Another important layer to uncover in this drama is the fact that these protests going on in Warri, much like any other event that has transpired within the country over the last eighteen months, also have consequences in the long term, striking at the core of Nigeria’s oil production and economic stability. Following the impromptu shutdown of the 28,000-barrel-per-day Escravos facility, a severe blow has been dealt to the country, even as it struggles in its quest to meet its production target of 2.06 million barrels per day by the end of 2025. Even before the Escravos shutdown, Nigeria struggled with meeting OPEC quotas due to technical issues, theft, and vandalism.
Businessmen and entrepreneurs based in the Niger Delta region are already sounding the alarm, desperately drawing people’s attention to the unavoidable economic consequences of the ongoing unrest, particularly the shutdown of the Escravos oil production facility. This closure has no doubt, triggered fears of severe setbacks not only for local businesses but also for Nigeria’s broader economic stability.
Further complications arise from the fact that the protests just happened to unfold at a most unfortunate time when decking oil revenues and external pressures from the U.S trade tariffs among others, places even more burdens on the strained economy.
A local entrepreneur in Warri named Martins expressed his concerns about the implications of the shutdown. According to him, “we already have a lot of problems on our hands. Our country’s, economy is currently on life support. This shutdown is only going to worsen matters for us because of the ripple effect it will have on our supply chain and revenue streams. If this issue is not resolved on time, a lot of businesses will tank.”
Martins stressed the fragile state of the local economy, which is heavily dependent on the oil sector. He said that further disruptions could not only deter potential investors, but drastically exacerbate existing challenges such as unemployment and poverty in the region. He argued that a more balanced approach is necessary to address the protesters’ grievances without sacrificing people’s livelihood.
The Situation At Hand
There have been suggestions involving the introduction and/or establishment of a neutral and truly independent body to oversee the ward delineation. Most importantly however, the Federal Government could prioritize direct engagement with the affected communities, demonstrating a commitment to resolving the issue and fostering trust among the parties involved. Calling this entire affair a bureaucratic disagreement would be doing it grave injustice. A lot of factors are at play in this conundrum. Years of deep-seated anxieties about ethnic marginalization have festered for generations, some of which have been justified subjectively by each of these groups.
Repeated contestation over political representation also reflects Nigeria’s unresolved questions about federalism and national identity. For many years the country has oscillated back and forth, between emphasizing unity and recognizing diversity, never fully committing to either vision. The Constitution’s federal character principle attempts to balance these competing impulses but leaves ambiguous the precise mechanisms for achieving equitable representation. The Warri crisis demonstrates how this ambiguity creates space for competing interpretations and claims, allowing historical grievances to persist across generations. Without clearer frameworks for balancing demographic realities with historical claims, such conflicts will likely remain recurring decimals in Nigeria’s progress.
While earlier generations might have accepted ethnic boundaries as fixed and immutable, contemporary communities have increasingly recognized the fluidity and social construction of ethnicity. Allegations of expansionist agendas reflect this contestation over identity and territory. Similarly, urbanization and internal migration have complicated formerly homogeneous areas, creating multi-ethnic spaces where simple demographic counting proves insufficient for determining representation. This evolution demands more sophisticated approaches to governance that can accommodate overlapping and sometimes contradictory ethnic claims without privileging any single narrative.
Furthermore, the ongoing conflict can not necessarily be divorced in entirety from the region’s oil wealth. The Niger Delta produces over 90% of Nigeria’s crude oil, making control over local governance structures a gateway to influence over resource allocation and development projects. When INEC redraws electoral boundaries, it is inadvertently reshaping access to the economic benefits that flow from proximity to power.
For the Itsekiri community, which has historically leveraged its early contact with European traders into political advantage, the proposed changes threaten not just their influence but their economic standing in a region where oil revenues dictate prosperity. It is safe to conclude that the protests mostly serve to be a demonstration of both their strategic importance to Nigeria’s economy and their willingness to protect their perceived rights.
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this entire crisis is that it highlights the people’s lack of confidence in Nigeria’s institutional frameworks for managing ethnic diversity. Despite constitutional provisions mandating federal character and equitable representation, implementation remains deeply contentious.
Interestingly, this communication breakdown reveals a broader pattern in which government agencies treat matters of representation as technical exercises rather than deeply political processes that require transparency, consultation, and sensitivity to historical context. INEC can possibly redeem themselves here by adequately engaging stakeholders and explaining their methodology for ward delineation. If they should continue to remain silent, their inaction might only serve to deepen existing suspicions of ethnic bias, which will further undermine their credibility.
For Nigeria’s democratic consolidation, the Warri crisis serves as a critical test case. True democracy goes beyond periodic elections, and demands for institutions capable of mediating competing interests and ensuring all citizens feel represented. INEC’s handling of this delineation exercise will either strengthen or undermine public confidence in electoral processes more broadly.
In similar vein, the government’s response will also signal its commitment to constitutional principles of equity and justice. Should authorities dismiss Itsekiri concerns as merely obstructionist or approach the matter purely as a security threat requiring suppression, they risk further alienating minority communities throughout Nigeria and deepening cynicism about democratic governance.
